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Liabilities Under Article 42 of the U.N.
Convention on the International Sale of Goods
Allen M. Shinn, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The growing volume of international trade has given rise to
increased concern for protecting intellectual property rights in
international commerce without inhibiting the freedom of com-
mercial transactions. While the Uruguay Round negotiations
have addressed broad protection for intellectual property rights
per se, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (1980) (CISG)' has created uniform
rules to govern international commercial transactions. With this
dual objective in mind, CISG Article 42 defines certain rights of
parties to international transactions in which the sale of goods
may infringe certain intellectual property rights.
The requirement of Article 42 that the seller deliver goods
free of third-party intellectual property claims appears to be
new in international commercial law.2 The essence of the obli-
gation is that the seller must deliver goods that, at the time of
contracting, were not subject to a third-party right or claim
based on intellectual property rights (IPRs) of which the seller
knew or should have known. In effect, the seller must indem-
nify the buyer against certain third-party claims against her
with respect to intellectual property rights. The seller's obliga-
tion extends only to rights or claims that exist under the law of
the state in which the goods will be used or resold, or, in the
alternative, under the law of the buyer's own state, and the
* Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.; University of North Caro-
lina, Ph.D. (1969); George Washington University, J.D. (1990).
1. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Dec. 11,
1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980),
[hereinafter CISG].
An excellent source of information on the CISG for practitioners is the
BUSINESS LAWS, INC., GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS CONVEN-
TION (1992, with annual supplements).
2. See infra notes 21-26 and acompanying text for background on prior
uniform law.
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seller is not liable for rights or claims of which the buyer knew
or should have known.
This Article first examines the legislative history of CISG
Article 42 as a guide to answering four interpretive questions:
1. What is the scope of "industrial property or other intel-
lectual property'? The charter of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO), referred to in the legislative history
of Article 42, defines the terms broadly.3 In the context of the
sale of goods, however, only trademark, copyright and patent
rights are important.4
2. What responsibility is placed on the seller by holding
her accountable for information of which she "could not have
been unaware"? "Could not have been unaware" can reasonably
be interpreted as expressing an idea akin to "ought to have
known," though it is a stricter standard subjecting the buyer to a
higher degree of proof.5
3. Can a seller 'now" of a claim that has not yet arisen?
Because intellectual property law is territorial, no claim will
usually arise under the laws of any State until the goods are im-
ported into that State. Article 42 limits the seller's liability to
claims of which she has knowledge at the time of contracting,
including knowledge that claims will arise upon import.6
4. What is a "State, " and is the seller always liable for IPR
claims against the buyer arising under the law of just one State?
"State" must always be singular, but it could mean both a na-
tion-state and its subordinate jurisdictions, and the law of such a
"State" may include supranational intellectual property law.7
The second part of this Article examines the practical impli-
cations of Article 42 as applied to transactions involving goods
imported into the United States and to goods exported from the
United States to the United Kingdom (to which a large body of
EC law on intellectual property would apply). This discussion is
limited to issues in trademark, copyright and patent, and is illus-
trative only; there are many situations other than those dis-
cussed here in which IPR claims will arise.8
3. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 59-74.
8. Claims might arise even in the absence of an import or export. For
example, if a German corporation bought, in the United States, goods manufac-
tured in the United States and then resold them to a second domestic U.S.
buyer, both sales would be covered by the CISG. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 1,
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE CISG
A. HISTORICAL INFORMATION
Efforts to unify international sales law, and thus reestablish
the Law Merchant which existed before the rise of modem na-
tion-states, date back to the nineteenth century.9 In the 1930s,
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) began drafting a uniform sales law, which eventu-
ally became a basis for the 1964 Hague Uniform Law of Interna-
tional Sales (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts.10 Many countries considered these laws unsatisfac-
tory, however, and they were never widely adopted.'1
In 1968, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was created. During the succeeding
nine years its Working Group on the International Sale of Goods
prepared a draft convention which was submitted, with com-
mentary by the U.N. Secretariat, to the Diplomatic Conference
held in March and April of 1980.12 The United States acceded to
the resulting CISG on December 11, 1986, and the treaty entered
into force in the United States on January 1, 1988.13
In general, the CISG governs only international sales,14 and
only commercial sales of goods.'5 Although its provisions deter-
mine whether the parties have formed a sales contract, the pro-
visions neither govern the validity of that contract, nor establish
when title to the goods passes from seller to buyer.16 The CISG
10. If the goods infringed a U.S. patent, there could be an IPR claim against the
buyer for which Article 42 would impose liability on the seller.
The point is that the range of possible IPR claims is co-extensive with the
intellectual property law which Article 42 selects to apply. There is no attempt
here to treat all such situations systematically.
9. See generally JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNI-
FORM LAW FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS CONVENTION (1989) [here-
inafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (Secretariat Commentary); Amy Kastely,
Unidfcation and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations
Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 579-85 (1988).
10. Kastely, supra note 9, at 580. States accepting the CISG must denounce
the Hague laws. CISG, supra note 1, art. 99(3).
11. Kastely, supra note 9, at 580.
12. Id. at 582.
13. CISG, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. 671.
14. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1). Within the United States, of course, Arti-
cle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs the sale of goods. The
UCC and the CISG are parallel codes; the former effective in the domestic con-
text, and the latter in the international context. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1992) roughly
parallels CISG Article 42. See infra note 25.
15. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 2(a), 3(2).
16. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4. Under some legal systems, title in goods
1993]
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also does not govern product liability claims.1 7
B. THE CISG IN PRACTICE
The CISG applies to any commercial sale of goods between
parties whose places of business are in different signatory
states.' 8 Contracting parties may, however, affirmatively pro-
vide that it shall not govern their contract,19 preferring instead
to rely on other law with which they are both familiar and satis-
fied. They may also choose to exclude certain articles of the
CISG. Because there are substantial uncertainties concerning
how the rights provided in Article 42 might be interpreted by a
court or an arbitrator, parties involved with intellectual prop-
erty issues would be wise to contractually exclude Article 42,
and specify in their contracts exactly how such issues will be
resolved.
Because of the short period in which it has been effective,
the CISG has had little interpretation by U.S. courts,20 and no
cases deal with Article 42. Therefore, practitioners and courts
alike must rely solely on the legislative history for its
interpretation.
C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 42
Prior uniform law on third-party claims was limited to Arti-
cle 52 of the 1964 Hague Convention relating to the Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) which provided
certain remedies to the buyer in the event of a third-party claim
on the goods. 21 Article 52 of the ULIS concerned defects in title,
passes when the contract is formed; in others it passes at a later time. The CISG
does not attempt to unify these rules. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at
407 (Secretariat Commentary 17, art. 4, cmt. 4).
17. CISG, supra note 1, art. 5.
18. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1. See id. art. 10 for a definition of "place of
business."
19. CISG Article 6 states, in pertinent part: "The parties may exclude the
application of the Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary
the effect of any of its provisions." CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. There is an ex-
ception to this rule with respect to statute of fraud issues. Id. art. 12.
20. The sole case reported to date dealing with the CISG appears to be Fi-
lanto v. Chilewich International Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) which
noted the absence of case law but added that "it may safely be predicted that
this will change" because of the broad applicability of the Convention. Id. at
1237.
21. Date-Bah, Third Party Claims in General, in COMMENTARY ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION (C.M. Bianca
& M.J. Bonell eds., 1987) (summarizing the history of the third-party liability
provisions of the CISG).
[Vol. 2:115
CISG ARTICLE 42
which may or may not have been a concept broad enough to en-
compass IPR claims; the generally accepted view was that it did
not.22 The 1977 "sales draft," as presented to UNCITRAL by the
Working Group, initially took a clear position: it included only a
simple provision on third-party claims,23 and expressly excluded
claims arising from intellectual property rights.24 While consid-
ering the 1977 draft, however, UNCITRAL set up a special
Working Group to draft provisions that would cover situations in
which third-party claims arose from IPRs. Apparently the
drafters believed that while domestic legal systems generally in-
clude an obligation to deliver goods free from third-party IPR
claims, such an obligation should be strictly limited in interna-
tional trade.25 As drafted by the special Working Group, these
provisions were part of the article on third-party rights. In fur-
22. ULIS Article 52 protected the buyer against "a right or claim of a third
person." Honnold says this did not include claims based on intellectual prop-
erty, and the secretariat commentary states that there was no prior uniform
law, but there is room to disagree. See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 268
(1982) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAW]; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at
426 (Secretariat Commentary, art. 40). But see Fritz Enderlein, Rights and Obli-
gations of the Seller Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES
133, 181 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986) (noting that at least one
scholar believed that ULIS Article 52 did cover intellectual property claims, but
assigning little importance to this question); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM
SALES LAW 73 (1986) (stating that German civil law and the ULIS both treat
third-party IPR claims "simply as defects in title infringing upon the use of
purchased goods.").
The drafters of what became CISG Article 42, however, believed that most
legal systems generally accepted the obligation they were creating. See DocU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 426 (Secretariat Commentary 36); cf U.C.C.
§ 2-312(3) (1992) ("[Gloods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any
third person by way of infringement or the like .... ").
23. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 333 (VIII Yearbook 40, para.
210).
24. Id. at 323 (VIII Yearbook 30, art. 7(b), para. 72). This provision was
removed when UNCITRAL adopted the broader provision which became CISG
Article 42. Id at 334. (VIII Yearbook 41, para. 226).
At the Diplomatic Convention, a minority believed that the CISG should
not try to deal with IPRs. In the end, three representatives abstained from the
final vote on Article 42 for this reason. Id. at 743 (Secretariat Commentary 208,
art. 40, cmt. 74).
25. The secretariat commentary says, "It appears to be the general rule in
most, if not all, legal systems that the seller is obligated to deliver goods free
from any right or claim of any third party based on industrial or intellectual
property." The commentary also states that while such an obligation is appro-
priate in domestic sales, liability should be limited in international sales because
it is more difficult to obtain the necessary information and because the seller
has no control over where the buyer resells or uses the goods. Id. at 426-27
1993]
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ther discussions, however, the drafters decided to provide two
separate articles, Article 25 dealing with third-party claims
other than those based on IPRs, and Article 26 dealing with
IPRs.26 These provisions were substantively very close to the
final form adopted in the CISG as Articles 41 and 42, although
their notification provisions were later moved to CISG Article
43.
D. FOUR QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION
Article 42 of the CISG obligates the seller to deliver goods to
the buyer free of third-party claims based on IPRs.27 This obli-
gation has five limitations, however. The seller is liable:
(1) only with respect to third-party claims of which he
knew or "could not have been unaware";
(2) only if that knowledge existed when the contract was
made;
(Secretariat Commentary 36-37, art. 40, cmts. 2-4); Enderlein, supra note 22, at
179.
Under the UCC, the seller is obligated to deliver goods free of third-party
claims related to "infringement." U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1992). The obligation is
limited, however, to merchants selling from their "normal stock" in the "nor-
mal course of business," and only to claims based on patent or trademark in-
fringement. Id (official cmt., para. 3).
26. See DOCiUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 333-34 (VIII Yearbook 40-
41, paras. 210-29); Date-Bah, supra note 21, at 316-17.
27. Article 42 provides:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or
claim of a third party based on industrial property or other intellectual
property, of which at the time of the conclusion of the contract the
seller knew or could not have been unaware, provided that the right or
claim is based on industrial property or other intellectual property:
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or
otherwise used, if it was contemplated by the parties at the time of
the conclusion of the contract that the goods would be resold or
otherwise used in that State; or
(b) in any other case, under the law of the State where the buyer
has his place of business.
(2) The obligation of the seller under the preceding paragraph does
not extend to cases where:
(a) at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew
or could not have been unaware of the right or claim; or
(b) the right or claim results from the seller's compliance with
technical drawings, designs, formulae or other such specifications
furnished by the buyer.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 42.
The objective of CISG Article 42, as defined by the special working group
which drafted it, is to "define the limits of the seller's responsibility... based on
industrial or intellectual property," and to "indicate which industrial or intel-
lectual property laws were relevant" to determine the obligation. DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 333 (VIII Yearbook 40, para. 215).
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(3) only if the buyer did not know and should not have
known of the claims;
(4) only if the claims do not arise out of the buyer's instruc-
tions with respect to specifications; and
(5) only under the law of one "State": that in which the
goods are to be used or resold if the contract or sur-
rounding circumstances make it clear what State this is,
or if not, then the State in which the buyer has her
place of business.
Subject to the first four conditions, the seller is liable for any
claim by a third party against the buyer that arises out of the
intellectual property law of the country determined by condi-
tion five.
Understanding the seller's liability under Article 42 re-
quires consideration of four questions.
1. What is the "industrial property or other intellectual
property" to which Article 42 applies?
Several widely recognized international conventions define
the terms industrial property and intellectual property. Under
the Paris Convention of 1883, as revised at Stockholm in 1967, 2s
"industrial property" includes patents, trademarks and related
concepts, but not copyrights - perhaps because at about the
same time, copyright was made the subject of the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886.29
The Berne Convention, most recently revised at Paris in 1971, is
the basis for most international copyright cooperation. The
United States, which participated in the original negotiation of
the Berne Convention in 1886, acceded to the convention only in
28. Article 1 of the Paris Convention states in pertinent part:
(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade
names and indications of source or appellations of origin, and the re-
pression of unfair competition.
(3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and
shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to
agricultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or natu-
ral products.
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1893, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 309, 311 (most recently revised at Stockholm on
June 14, 1967).
29. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of
1886, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.S.T. 221 (Stockholm revision of 1967). The latest revi-
sion, to which the United States has adhered, is the Paris revision of July 24,
1971. See 1 Basic Doc. Int'l Econ. L. (CCH) 715 (1990).
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1988.30
From the standpoint of the CISG, however, the most rele-
vant definition of "intellectual property" is that of the World In-
tellectual Property Organization (WIPO) because the phrase
"industrial property or other intellectual property" was adopted
at the Diplomatic Conference at the suggestion of WIPO.3 '
WIPO's broad definition of intellectual property encompasses
essentially "all . . .rights resulting from intellectual activity in
the industrial, scientific, literary, or artistic fields. '32 Thus, any
rights related to patents, copyrights, trade or service marks,
trade secrets (as a branch of unfair trade), or mask works33
would fall within the definition.34 Article 42 is most likely to
30. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (U.S. adherence effective Mar. 1, 1989).
31. The WIPO suggestion, DOCUMENTARY HIsToRy, supra note 9, at 399
(Pre-Conference Proposals 78, art. 40, para. 2), was introduced by Finland, with-
drawn after the Greek representative raised a minor objection, then later rein-
troduced by Argentina and adopted without discussion. Apparently there was
no other discussion of what "industrial property or other intellectual property"
should mean. Id. at 546 (Proposed Amendments; Action by First Committee 325,
17th meeting, paras. 45-47); id. at 549 (First Committee Deliberations 328, paras.
92-93); id. at 682 (First Committee Decision 110, art. 40, para. B.2); see also id. at
426 (Secretariat Commentary 36, art. 40, n. 1) (referring to the WIPO conven-
tion in defining "intellectual property").
32. Article 2 of the WIPO Convention states:
(viii) "intellectual property" shall include the rights relating to:
- literary, artistic and scientific works,
- performances of performing artists, phonograms and
broadcasts,
- inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
- scientific discoveries,
- industrial designs,
- trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and
designations,
- protection against unfair competition,
and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the indus-
trial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, 11 (amended by KAV 2464).
33. A trade secret is any information about a process, device, or formula
that is useful in business and confers an advantage on its holder because it is not
known (or knowable by proper means) to competitors. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTs § 757 (1934); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAw § 3.01(1)
(1992). The process for making a new product, for example, could be protected
either by patenting the process or by simply keeping the new process secret.
A "mask work" is the set of images that define the layout of a semiconduc-
tor chip product. See 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (1992).
34. Some intellectual property rights are not likely to arise in the context
of the sale of goods. Unfair competition is included within the WIPO definition,
but much of it, such as false advertising and price discrimination, has nothing to
do with IPRs. Trade secrets, a branch of unfair competition, are within the
[Vol. 2:115
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affect the rights associated with trademarks, copyrights, and pat-
ents, because only these rights are likely to be infringed by the
sale of goods.35
Government restrictions on the sale or use of goods, such as
export and import controls or health and safety regulations, are
not within the definition. The drafters were concerned early in
the drafting process that provisions derived from ULIS Articles
52-53 might be interpreted to apply to government imposed re-
strictions.36 One representative even proposed redrafting CISG
provisions derived from ULIS Articles 52-53 to cover restrictions
imposed by government regulations, 37 but this view was not well
received. Most representatives believed that CISG Article 42,
like its predecessors in the ULIS, should deal with encum-
brances to title; government restrictions seldom went to matters
of this sort, and could thus be better handled through other pro-
visions.38 This view was finally adopted. In the CISG, claims
arising from government restrictions must be dealt with under
Articles 30 and 35,39 or under other law.40
concept of IPRs, but the trade secret owner's action is against the party who
acquires the secret improperly. ROGER SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 137-38 (1986). A third party who innocently ac-
quires a trade secret is not liable for its use prior to being notified that the
information is secret, and may not even be enjoined from future use if it has
changed its position in the meantime. Id at 136.
An analogous rule applied to process patents until the Process Patent
Amendment Act of 1988 amended 35 U.S.C. § 154 to provide that use or sale of a
product made in violation of a process patent infringes the patent. Under the
old rule the remedy was only against the manufacturer who actually used the
process. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 9002, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154); see also 4 DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENTS § 16.02[6] (1989). At least under U.S. law, a good faith buyer
should not be liable on a trade secret theory if the goods turn out to have been
made through use of a stolen trade secret.
35. Under the UCC, the seller's obligation is limited to claims based on
patent or trademark infringement. See supra note 25. If this is typical of other
legal systems, and if the purpose of CISG Article 42, as stated by the secretariat
commentary, i&, is to further limit the obligation imposed by domestic law,
then there is an argument that only patent and trademark are intended to be
within the definition.
36. See DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 9, at 107 (III Yearbook 90, pa-
ras. 128-30).
37. I& para. 128.
38. Id. paras. 128-130, 138; id at 334 (VIII Yearbook 41, para. 220); Id. at 426
(Sec. Comm. 36, art 34, cmt. 5).
39. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 22, at 73.
40. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 334 (VIII Yearbook 41, para.
220).
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2. What standard is meant by "could not have been
unaware"?
This is the most difficult question Article 42 raises. The
seller is liable for third-party claims of which she "knew or
could not have been unaware."'41 Because the language appears
redundant, the phrase "could not have been unaware" must be a
term of art.42
The secretariat commentary states that "the seller 'could
not have been unaware' of the third-party claim if that claim
was based on a patent application or grant which had been pub-
lished in the country in question.143 This appears to place an
affirmative obligation on the seller to research the patent (and
by analogy, copyright and trademark) registries of the country
in which the buyer will use or resell the goods. The secretariat
commentary reinforces this view by stating further that "[The
seller is in a position to ascertain whether any third party has
industrial or intellectual property rights or claims .... "44 The
legislative history, however, does not support the Secretariat's
view. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) com-
mented to the Diplomatic Conference that the Secretariat's view
was incorrect. 45 But there is no indication that this criticism was
accepted or even debated, nor is there an indication of the stan-
dard that the ICC would have applied.
Schlechtriem takes a position at least as broad as the Secre-
tariat: the seller "must inform himself about the possible indus-
trial or other intellectual property rights of third persons with
regard to the goods sold."6 At the opposite extreme, Huber ar-
gues that the seller is liable only for fraudulently maintaining
silence about IPRs of which she has actual knowledge. 47
41. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(1).
42. Clearly, one who "could not be unaware" must be "aware," and there-
fore must "know." A more familiar phrasing would be "knew or should have
known." That the phrase must be a term of art is shown by the fact that during
drafting negotiations, a suggestion that it be dropped as a tautology was re-
jected. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
43. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 427 (Secretariat Commentary
37, art. 40, cmt. 6). The "country in question" is the country in which the goods
are to be used or sold, if that country is identified by the context of the transac-
tion, or failing that, the buyer's country. See inf ra text accompanying notes 59-
74.
44. Id at 427 (Secretariat Commentary 37, art. 40, cmt. 5).
45. Id at 399 (Pre Conference Proposals 78, art. 40, para. 5).
46. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 22, at 74.
47. Id. at n. 284. Schlechtriem criticizes this as far too narrow an
interpretation.
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One approach to finding the middle ground between
Schlechtriem and Huber is to look for consistent use of the
phrase within Article 42. Seller is not liable if buyer knows or
"could not have been unaware" of the right or claim.48 Does this
mean that buyer has the same duty as seller to learn of IPRs?
The phrase used is the same; it should mean the same thing in
both places.49 If, however, both seller and buyer have the same
obligation to learn of published intellectual property rights, the
buyer's duty negates the seller's obligation: if seller "could not
have been unaware" neither could buyer, so seller is not liable.
Does this deprive the phrase of any meaning at all? Cer-
tainly not. Regardless of whether either seller or buyer has a
duty to learn of published IPRs, both may have a duty to learn of
rights through information that is routinely or uniquely in their
possession. Thus, if seller holds patent rights on the goods, he
might reasonably be expected to know whether these rights
have been licensed in buyer's country, and if so, to whom. Alter-
natively, buyer, holding a license to use a trademark in country
B, might be held responsible for knowing that in country C the
same trademark is licensed to another, while seller might be a
wholesaler unaccustomed to selling to either country B or C, and
thus unlikely to know of such licenses. In such situations it
might be perfectly appropriate to hold one side or the other re-
sponsible for knowledge of the pertinent IPR.5°
The legislative history of "could not have been unaware" as
the phrase is used in Article 8 of the treaty supports this inter-
pretation.51 In the negotiations leading up to the diplomatic con-
ference at which the treaty was finally considered, the U.K.
representative suggested that "knew or could not have been un-
aware" stated a tautology, and that the second part of the phrase
should be dropped.52 The secretariat commentary, while not ad-
48. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(2)(a).
49. But see Enderlein, supra note 22, at 182 (asking "Is (buyer] obliged to
conduct research regarding the patent situation in his country or the country of
destination? I don't think so.").
50. Under the UCC, a person has "notice" of a fact when "from all the facts
and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know
that it exists." U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1992). Such a person cannot escape liabil-
ity by willfully remaining ignorant of facts that would have been discovered by
questions a prudent person would ask under the circumstances. The phrase
"could not have been unaware" used in CISG Article 42 may impose an analo-
gous duty.
51. CISG Article 8 discusses the extent to which knowledge of one party's
intent is to be imputed to another party. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
52. DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 394 (Pre conference Proposals
73, art. 7, para. 3).
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dressing the point directly, appeared to equate "could not be un-
aware" with "had no reason [not] to know." 3 Subsequent
discussions in the First Committee dipped into Kantian philoso-
phy at one point but can fairly be read to mean that "could not
be unaware" expresses an idea akin to "ought to have known,"
but is a stricter standard requiring a higher degree of proof.54
Certainly there is nothing in this discussion that suggests that
the phrase places an affirmative obligation on the seller to
search for information that is not readily discoverable in the cir-
cumstances that precede and surround the contract negotiations.
Finally, one might approach the question from the stand-
point of commercial practicality, asking when the duty to learn
of IPR claims, if there is one, arises. Seller's liability is limited
to claims of which she knew or could not have been unaware "at
the time of conclusion of the contract." 55 What the seller learns
after the contract is made is irrelevant. This militates against
the seller's broad duty to research possible IPR claims in buyer's
country. Such research would often be impractical where seller
receives an order for goods under commercial circumstances re-
quiring a prompt decision to accept or reject the offer. But it
would be perfectly rational to hold seller responsible for infor-
mation that would reasonably be expected to be in her posses-
sion at the time of contracting (such as the patent licenses
suggested above).
Thus, there are three good arguments that the broad inter-
pretation of "could not have been unaware" that the Secretariat
and Schlechtriem suggested is incorrect. The same conclusion
follows whether one approaches the problem as a matter of con-
sistent interpretation within Article 42, of consistent interpreta-
tion between Article 8 and Article 42,56 or as a matter of
commercial practicality. But these arguments do not force one
back to Huber's narrow "fraudulent silence" interpretation.
Something in between is more reasonable.
The most logical interpretation is that "could not have been
unaware" places a duty on both seller and buyer to not be negli-
53. Id. at 408 (Secretariat Commentary 18, art. 7, cmts. 3-4).
54. Id. at 480-81 (First Committee Deliberations 259-60, 6th meeting, art. 7,
paras. 3-19). Perhaps the best interpretation is that the seller is liable in cir-
cumstances such that a judge could not believe that she did not know. Id. at 481
(First Committee Deliberations 260, 6th meeting, art. 7, para. 6).
55. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(1).
56. Elsewhere in the CISG, the phrase "could not have been unaware" is
used only in Articles 35 and 40. The legislative history of those articles throws
no light on the subject.
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gent about information that is reasonably at hand at the time
they form a contract, especially if the other side is not likely to
have the same information. The buyer's burden of proof is fairly
heavy, perhaps close to gross negligence. Thus, the seller's lia-
bility may be limited to situations in which circumstances make
it impossible for a judge to believe that seller did not know of
the information at issue.57
3. Can a seller "know" of a claim which has not yet arisen
because the goods have not yet been imported to the State
under the laws of which IPR claims may be brought?
Because intellectual property law is highly territorial, there
will usually be no claim until the goods are actually imported.
The seller's liability, however, is limited to claims of which he
has knowledge at the time of contracting. Thus, when the con-
tract is made before the goods are imported, there can be no lia-
bility unless seller can "know" of a claim which has not yet
arisen.
The best argument that Article 42 should be interpreted to
impose liability in such cases is that the alternative would make
the entire article meaningless except when the goods are im-
ported before the sales contract is made. In such a case, how-
ever, the IPR holder would have a direct action against seller, so
there would be little need for Article 42. This interpretation
would also come close to violating the canon that a legal provi-
sion should not be interpreted so as to deprive it of all meaning.
It is unlikely that the drafters intended to impose liability only
in such exceptional cases.
Domestic law provides a useful analogy, but one that is im-
perfect because it does not involve the import question. The
UCC provides that the seller's liability extends to claims related
to patent or trademark that "will mar the buyer's title." By
analogy, seller's liability should extend to claims which she
"knew," at the time the contract was made, would arise upon
import.
4. Is seller's obligation to know of IPR claims always
restricted to just one State?
The seller is liable with respect to claims:
(a) [U]nder the law of the State where the goods will be re-
57. See supra note 54.
58. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1992) (official cmt., para. 3) (emphasis added).
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sold or otherwise used, if it was contemplated by the
parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract that
the goods would be resold or otherwise used in that
State; or
(b) [I]n any other case, under the law of the State where the
buyer has his place of business.59
"State" is always used in the singular.
An initial difficulty in determining seller's liability is estab-
lishing whether the parties "contemplated," when the contract
was made, a particular "state" in which the goods would be used
or resold. Presumably the parties could "contemplate" outside
of the contract itself, and might anticipate different destinations
for the goods at different times.6° Seller is not bound by the
buyer's private contemplations - the "parties" must do the con-
templating - but if these contemplations are unclear, buyer
might assert liability against seller for IPR claims arising in sev-
eral different countries. 6' Seller should insist on clarity on this
point in the contract.
Assuming that the contemplations of the parties are clear,
there remains a question of whether "State" means only a na-
tion-state competent to be party to the Convention, or is more
encompassing. Enderlein says the "seller's responsibility... al-
ways applies only to one country .... -62 He clearly believes that
"State" means country. That view is supported by the fact that
"State" is capitalized in Article 42 just as it is in the preamble
and in Article 1, where it is clearly limited to a nation-state com-
petent to adhere to the Convention.
Such a narrow definition is unsatisfactory, however, because
not all intellectual property law is national law. For example,
U.S. patent and copyright laws are almost entirely federal, but
both federal and state law protect trademarks, and trade secrets
are protected mainly under state doctrines.6 3 Yet all these
forms of intellectual property are clearly within the definitions
59. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(1). "Place of business" is defined in id art.
10 as: "that which has the closest relationship to the contract and its perform-
ance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the par-
ties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract."
60. "Contemplations" after the contract is made, however, are irrelevant.
Id. art. 42(1).
61. Because Article 42 says "the State," it unlikely that buyer could simul-
taneously assert claims based on the law of more than one State. The important
question will be which State's law is invoked. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(1)(a).
62. Enderlein, supra note 22, at 181.
63. Trademarks are protected under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1128 (1988), but also under various state statutes and common law doctrines.
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used in the Paris Convention6 ' and by WIPO.e5 If the buyer is to
be protected against third-party rights based on all these kinds
of intellectual property, "State" must include a state of the
United States as well as the United States itself. Therefore,
"State" must mean a nation-state and its subordinate
jurisdictions.
Intellectual property law is increasingly supranational law
as well. The European Community has made progress toward
both a Community trademark and a Community patent.6e A sig-
nificant body of law on the application of IPRs, especially as it
affects unfair competition and antitrust, is now Community
law.67 Moreover, the United States is seeking to establish "sub-
stantive standards in the areas of patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, trade secrets, and semiconductor chip layout designs" in
the GATT Uruguay Round;68 as is the European Community. 9
The doctrines of "direct application" and "direct effect,"
which incorporate community law into national law and where
necessary preempt it, are well established in the European Coin-
See JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.04[2][a]&[b]
(1989).
Trade secrets, however, are protected primarily under state common law
tort doctrines. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio 1963)
(enjoining a former employee from using secret information in new employ-
ment). Trade secrets are not important in the context of CISG Article 42. See
supra note 34.
64. See supra note 28.
65. See supra note 32.
66. See AUDREY WINTER ElT AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAw-
YER'S GUIDE 128-30 (1989). Although it had been expected that the European
Community Patent and European Community Trademark, which would pro-
vide protection throughout the European Community on the basis of a single
filing, would be available by the beginning of 1993, conflicts over siting the new
offices and the languages to be used have delayed implementation. See EC
Leaders Agree on Institutions's Siting, Improving Paten Trademark Rules,
Int'l Bus. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 15, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BNAIBD File.
67. See generally David Vaughn, Competition, in 52 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND §§ 19.325-19.52 (4th ed. 1986) (dealing with the exercise of intellectual
property rights); WINTER, supra note 66, at 127-33.
68. C. Michael Hathaway, A New Dimension for Trade Policy: The Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property, INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 1989, at 3. The United
States tabled a draft agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property
rights (TRIPs) in the Uruguay Round in May, 1990. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
(May 16,1990). As of late 1992, Uruguay Round negotiations continued to move
slowly. See GATT Talks Run Against the Clock, FIN. TDMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at 5.
69. Draft Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, GATI' Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 27, 1990) (EC proposal to
GATT Negotiating Group on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights).
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munity.7 0 Thus, if the relevant State for purposes of Article 42 is
a member of the European Community, community law is na-
tional law. In other cases, a State might have accepted interna-
tional law, yet still have conflicting national law in effect. A
third party might legitimately base an IPR claim on either or
both sets of laws, raising questions as to whether seller would be
liable under Article 42.
Although the member states of the European Community
are increasingly becoming part of an integrated market in which
there is free movement of goods,7' seller is probably not subject
to liability based on the laws of more than one state. The CISG
language requires the parties to "contemplate" use of the goods
in "the State. '72 Additionally, the parties to the Convention are
member states of the European Community; the European Com-
munity itself is not a party.73 Thus, it seems likely that at this
time, "State" could not be interpreted to mean the European
Community. The fact that the legislative history almost always
uses the phrase "the State" strengthens the interpretation that
"State" means a signatory nation-state and its subordinate
jurisdictions.74
70. See John Usher, Application of Community Law in National Courts,
in 51 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 3.41-3.42 (4th ed. 1986). "Direct appli-
cation" is the doctrine by which EC treaties and regulations automatically be-
come part of national law, even in countries whose own legal systems do not
make it so. Id. at § 3.41; see Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, ECR 585 (1964), re-
printed in Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023 (1965) at 7390. "Direct effect" goes
further; it establishes that certain elements of EC law may act directly "to cre-
ate rights and obligations enforceable by individuals before their national
courts," rather than simply binding the member states themselves. Usher, Id.
at § 3.41.
71. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EC
TREATY], tit. I, arts. 9-37. Free movement within the European Community of
goods admitted properly to any member state is a key element of EC law.
72. CISG, supra note 1, art. 42(1)(a).
73. Of the European Community member states, Denmark, Germany,
France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain have acceded to the CISG as of
May 1992. The European Community is not a party to the CISG. BUSINESS
LAws, INC., supra note 1, at 100.05-.09.
74. The only apparent exception is a statement that "The seller breaches
... if a third party has [an IPR claim] under the law of a state where the goods
are to be resold...." DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 427 (Secretariat
Commentary 37, art. 40, cmt. 5) (emphasis added). An argument that this al-
lows a plural interpretation of "State," however, could be countered by noting
UNCITRAL's statement that the objective of limiting the seller's liability "was
achieved by selecting the law of the State where the goods would be used ......
Id. at 333 (VIII Yearbook 40, para. 215) (emphasis added).
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II. HOW MIGHT ARTICLE 42 APPLY IN PRACTICE?
The foregoing discussion of Article 42's reach and effect has
been quite abstract, as it must be in the absence of cases inter-
preting these provisions in specific factual situations. In an at-
tempt to reduce this level of abstraction, the following section
describes a number of situations under U.S. or EC law in which
Article 42 liability could arise. Because intellectual property
rights vary depending on the jurisdiction and particular factual
scenario, this section is solely illustrative, and intended only to
provide a feel for how Article 42 might work in practice. The
discussion is limited to patent, copyright and trademark, and un-
doubtedly there are many other fact patterns involving even
these forms of IPRs that could arise. The application of Article
42 could also vary greatly in other jurisdictions. The discussion
is organized around the country to which the goods are imported
because the seller's liability under Article 42 is predicated on
third-party claims against the buyer under the law of the coun-
try in which the goods will be resold or used, or the country of
the buyer's place of business.
A. COPYRIGHT OR PATENT INFRINGEMENT BY IMPORTS INTO
THE UNITED STATES.
An item that would have infringed a U.S. copyright or pat-
ent if it had been made in the United States infringes similarly
when made abroad and imported in at least three situations:
(a) An item protected by U.S. copyright that is manufac-
tured abroad without a license from the copyright owner cannot
legally be imported into the United States.75 Such an item
would be a "pirate" copy, to be distinguished from a "gray mar-
ket" copy.76 If the infringement is deliberate ("criminal in-
fringement") goods so imported may be seized and forfeited.77
75. 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1988) ("where the making of the copies or pho-
norecords would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had
been applicable, their importation is prohibited.").
76. If only a trademark has been counterfeited, the issue is not one of copy-
right. The Tariff Act of 1930 § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988), generally makes it
unlawful to import goods bearing a trademark registered in the United States
without permission of the trademark holder. The goods may be seized by Cus-
toms pending decisions of the trademark holder, but the remedies are generally
limited to obliterating the trademark or re-exporting the goods. See infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1988). "Criminal infringement" is that done "will-
fully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain . "
I&, § 506(a); see 3 MELVILLE B. NiMmER & DAVID NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 14.11[B] (1992) (reviewing customs regulations for enforcing § 602(b)).
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(b) An item made overseas that would infringe a U.S. pat-
ent if made in the United States, infringes if imported and used
or sold in the United States.78
(c) An item that is itself not patented but is made abroad
by a process patented in the United States infringes the process
patent if imported without authority of the patent owner.79
In each of these circumstances, a U.S. buyer's violation of
copyright or patent law would give rise to a claim by the copy-
right or patent holder against the buyer, and Article 42 would
give the buyer an offsetting claim against the seller.8s
B. "GRAY MARKET" IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES.
"Gray market" refers to trade in goods for which the owner
has licensed the trademark, copyright, or patent with respect to
certain countries or other geographic areas, but which are traded
within those areas outside the terms of the license. To the ex-
tent that a trademark, copyright or patent owner or licensee
may prevent goods from moving into a licensed area outside of
the terms of the license, the seller of gray market goods may be
liable to the buyer under Article 42.
1. Trademark
The leading case addressing gray market imports of trade-
marked goods is K-Mart v. Cartier, Inc.,81.which interpreted sec-
tion 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.82 K-Mart treated three gray
market scenarios:
Case 1 involves a foreign manufacturer that licenses its
trademark to a domestic U.S. firm, which then imports and dis-
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). Pirate goods manufactured overseas in viola-
tion of a U.S. patent may sometimes be excluded at the border. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1337, 1337(a) (1988); see CIusuM, supra note 34, § 16.05[3] (1989).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
80. In addition to protection under the patent laws, section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 provides that a domestic industry injured by "unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States" may petition the International
Trade Commission for an order excluding the articles concerned. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a), (d) (1988). Imports of articles infringing patents are within the scope
of such "unfair acts." I& § 1337(a); In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826
(C.C.P.A. 1935); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934). Because section
337 of the Tariff Act provides for future exclusion of the infringing goods,
rather than a right of action against the buyer, CISG Article 42 is not
implicated.
81. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988).
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tributes the trademarked goods in the United States.83 The
question was whether such a licensee, which may have paid a
substantial fee for the trademark license, may then prevent the
foreign manufacturer itself or a third party from importing the
trademarked goods and selling them in the United States in
competition with the licensee. Congress passed section 526 to
protect the U.S. licensee in this situation. As interpreted, the
rule is that the U.S. licensee is protected so long as she has inde-
pendently developed goodwill in the United States through ser-
vice, warranty programs, advertising or the like.s4 A U.S. third-
party buyer of such non-licensed goods would thus be subject to
a claim by the licensee based on the trademark license; Article
42 would give the buyer an offsetting claim against the overseas
seller.
Case 2 involves a U.S. firm that imports and distributes in
the United States, under a U.S. trademark, goods that are manu-
factured abroad by an affiliated firm. Variations include a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign firm (Case 2a), a foreign subsidiary of a
U.S. firm (Case 2b), or an unincorporated overseas manufactur-
ing division of a U.S. firm (Case 2c) importing the goods.85 K-
Mart held that if the trademarked goods were sold abroad to a
third party in a Case 2 scenario, the goods could be imported
freely into the United States and sold in competition with the
U.S. owner of the trademark; this ruling upheld long-standing
Customs regulations denying protection in this situation.8e The
apparent rationale is that the owner of the trademark, whether
in the United States or abroad, can prevent such sales by refus-
ing to sell to the third party in the first place. Because K-Mart
denied the domestic trademark owner relief, this situation
would not give rise to a third-party IPR claim under Article 42;
raising no issue of liability for the foreign seller.8 7
Case 3 involves a domestic trademark holder that licenses
his trademark to a foreign manufacturer for use in a designated
overseas territory. K-Mart held that the U.S. licensor is pro-
83. K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 286.
84. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(U.S. licensee of "Mamiya" camera trademark could prevent parallel importa-
tion and sale of such cameras under that trademark).
85. K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 286-87. Note that transfers to or from an unincor-
porated subsidiary would not be sales, and thus would not be covered by the
CISG.
86. Id at 287-291.
87. In the case of a U.S. firm importing the products of its own unincorpo-
rated overseas manufacturing division, there would be no sale, therefore the
CISG would be inapplicable.
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tected against imports of the foreign manufactured goods carry-
ing the licensed trademark by either the licensee or a third
party88 A buyer importing such goods into the United States
would be vulnerable to the U.S. licensor's IPR claim, and Article
42 would give him an offsetting claim against the licensee-
seller.89
2. Copyright
K-Mart clarifies U.S. law with respect to trademarks, but it
says nothing about copyright and patent situations. 9 The copy-
right statute itself, however, is fairly clear. The general rule is
that importing an item which is copyrighted in the United
States, without permission of the copyright owner, infringes the
copyright even if the item was lawfully manufactured abroad
(presumably under license from the U.S. copyright owner).9 ' If
the item is a pirate copy (i.e., manufactured without benefit of a
license), Customs can stop it at the border, but if the overseas
manufacture is licensed, the copyright holder's only remedy is
an infringement suit after importation.92 Thus, the distinctions
elaborated in K-Mart are not relevant to copyright; the copyright
statute protects the copyright owner against gray market im-
ports into the United States.9 3 A third-party copyright owner
would have a claim against a buyer who, without permission, im-
ports or subsequently uses or sells a copyrighted item manufac-
tured abroad, whether done under color of license or not; Article
88. K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 287.
89. Assuming, of course, that the United States was the country in which
use or resale of the goods was contemplated in the contract, or, in the absence of
such contemplations, the country of the buyer's place of business.
90. There was no majority in K-Mart behind any consistent theory; the
holding on Case 2 was by a majority of 6-3; that on Case 3 was by a different
majority of 5-4. This dichotomy alone would make its extension to copyright
and patent situations problematic. In addition, copyrights and patents involve
concepts and policy considerations very different from trademarks.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 169-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785-87. There are excep-
tions covering imports for the use of the government, an individual traveler,
and scholarly purposes.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 170.
93. See 2 NnmI~M, supra note 77, § 8.12[B][6]. The copyright statute explic-
itly covers situations analogous to K-Mart Case 3 and Case 2b (foreign subsidi-
ary of U.S. corporation). But under various international copyright agreements,
most importantly the Berne Convention, supra note 30, the work of an author
who is a national of or resident in a Convention member country, or work first
published in such a country, is protected as of it were a U.S. work. That would
appear to provide the same protections for K-Mart Case 1 and Case 2a (U.S.
subsidiary of foreign corporation).
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42 would generally give the buyer a claim against the seller for
the resulting damages.
3. Patent
Although the patent statute is clear with respect to the right
to exclude pirate goods manufactured outside the United States,
the right to exclude gray market goods depends on case law de-
veloped primarily in the area of interaction of patent and anti-
trust law, and is neither simple nor well-settled. Under the
"first sale" doctrine, the sale of a patented article exhausts the
monopoly; the buyer is free to resell as he pleases.94 Under
other doctrines, however, a patent owner is generally free to li-
cense the use of his patent in a particular territory. Some cases
illustrate how parties' rights are resolved in situations analogous
to K-Mart:
K-Mart Case 1: In Brownell v. Ketcham Wire and s(.
Co.,95 the Ninth Circuit upheld a patent license in a context
analogous to K-Mart Case 1: a foreign patent holder licensed its
patent to a U.S. corporation for use in the United States, agree-
ing not to export its own product to the United States; the U.S.
licensee similarly agreed not to export to any foreign country.
Although the court suggested that the arrangement might have
to be tested under antitrust doctrines, it found the arrangement
legal as a matter of patent law; violation of the agreement by
either side would infringe the license.96 A U.S. third-party
buyer from the foreign licensor would be liable to the U.S. licen-
see for infringing the license, and Article 42 would give him an
offsetting claim against the seller. This is entirely reasonable
because the seller obviously would have to know about the li-
cense. A third party buying from the foreign patent holder over-
seas, however, would not thereby violate the U.S. licensee's
rights, and the first sale doctrine would allow him to export
freely to the United States. Neither the U.S. buyer nor the for-
eign exporter would be subject to a third-party IPR claim; conse-
quently, Article 42 would not come into play.
K-Mart Case 3: Beckton, Dickenson & Co. v. Eisele & Co. 97 is
the leading case illustrating K-Mart Case 3 in the patent context.
94. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895) (buyer of
patented goods from the patentee could resell them even within the exclusive
territory granted to a third-party patent licensee); CHaSUM, supra note 34, § 22
16.03[2] (1989).
95. 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
96. I& at 129; see 5 CHISuM supra note 34, § 19.04[3][h] (1992).
97. 86 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936).
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The case involved a U.S. owner of a patent on a special steel that
gave an exclusive license to a foreign manufacturer to make, and
sell in the United States, a particular item made from the steel.
The court broadly upheld the right of the licensee to restrict the
way it would sell the product in the United States.98 However, if
the licensee were to sell overseas to a third party who then im-
ported the steel into the United States, the first sale doctrine
would prevent an action for infringement of the patent.9 Arti-
cle 42 would not apply because in this situation, the first sale
doctrine would preclude a violation of U.S. patent law.
K-Mart Case 2: By extension of the reasoning behind Case 1
and Case 3, it would appear that licensing agreements between a
U.S. firm and its foreign subsidiary, or a foreign firm and its U.S.
subsidiary, would be upheld, but that in both situations the first
sale doctrine would prevent an action against a third-party seller
who exported to a U.S. buyer outside of the license
arrangements.
In summary, U.S. law as propounded in K-Mart protects
trademark owners or licensees against gray market imports in
Cases 1 and 3, but not in Case 2. In effect, K-Mart refused to
recognize the first sale doctrine in Cases 1 and 3, but did recog-
nize it in Case 2. With respect to copyright, the statute grants
protection in all three cases, including situations involving a
third party, because the first sale doctrine in copyright does not
apply unless the item is both made and sold in the United States.
Finally, there is patent-based protection against gray market
competition between patent licensors and licensees, but not be-
tween third parties and either licensees or licensors, because the
first sale doctrine does apply.1°° In each instance in which K-
Mart or the relevant statute protects the IPR holder, Article 42
gives the buyer a cause of action against the seller for any liabil-
ity resulting from the breach of the domestic trademark, copy-
right or patent.
C. IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM (WITH
CONSIDERATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw).
Intellectual property protection in the United Kingdom is
broadly similar to U.S. law, although there are differences in de-
tail. European Community law, however, limits the exercise of
98. I& at 269-70.
99. I& at 270; see 5 CHISUM, supra note 34, § 19-04[3][h] (1992).
100. Note that the only cause of action is against the licensee seller, not the
buyer. CISG Article 42 is not relevant.
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rights granted by national law; it considers intellectual property
rights in the context of competition, and, at least within the Eu-
ropean Community, tends to resolve the tension against the IPR
holder and in favor of free markets.1 1 Thus gray market im-
ports, in general, are allowed regardless of national law.
1. Trademark
Although the U.K. trademark statute includes provisions
whereby a trademark holder may prevent imports that would
infringe the mark in the United Kingdom,10 2 under EC law a
trademark holder may not use the mark to partition markets
and thereby restrain trade.'0 3 The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) held that Article 30 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community'" forbade restrictions on the free movement
of goods, and that the exception to this rule for matters of indus-
trial property contained in Article 36 of the Treaty 0 5 had to be
narrowly construed and limited to the "specific subject matter"
of the right concerned.'06 With respect to trademarks, the ECJ
held that the specific subject matter was the "exclusive right to
use that trademark, for the purpose of putting products pro-
tected by the trademark into circulation for the first time
.... "07 In other words, once the goods were sold lawfully bear-
ing the trademark, the holder exhausted his rights and could not
prevent gray market imports. This is a strong version of the
"first sale" doctrine.
A subsequent case, Terrapin v. Terranova, illustrates the
line, under EC law, between unacceptable use of a trademark
to prevent gray market imports and acceptable use to prevent
consumer confusion.0 8 A German manufacturer of building
materials that used the trademark "Terranova" previously, suc-
101. See Vaughn, supra note 67, paras. 19.326-28 and para. 19.333.
102. See Robin Jacob & Martin Howe, Trade Marks, Trade Names and De.
signs, in 48 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 85-92 (1984).
103. See id. para. 102.
104. "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect shall... be prohibited between Member States." EC TREATY,
supra note 71, at art. 30.
105. "The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of ...
the protection of industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions or re-
strictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Id. at art. 36.
106. Case 16/74 Centrafarm v. Winthrop E.C.R. 1183, 1194 (1974).
107. Id.
108. Case 119/75 Terrapin v. Terranova E.C.R. 1039 (1976).
19931
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
cessfully opposed German registration of "Terrapin" - the inde-
pendently-adopted trademark of an unrelated English building
materials manufacturer who wished to expand into Germany -
because under German law, the two trademarks and the prod-
ucts they identified were similar enough to risk confusing the
customer. In a subsequent action, Terranova successfully pre-
vented Terrapin from actually using its mark in Germany. The
ECJ distinguished this situation from gray market imports, and
agreed that a national court could, on the basis of a finding of
possible confusion, restrain imports using the confusing mark.1°9
The ECJ has also accepted the argument that trademarks or
other intellectual property rights involving an "open" exclusive
license may be justified on grounds of the economic risk that the
licensee accepts in developing a market for a new product.110
But such a license, by definition, does not seek to restrain third-
party, gray market importers.
Thus, EC law will always allow parallel imports of goods to
which the mark has been applied under license. Consequently, a
seller need not be concerned with Article 42 liability for third-
party claims against the buyer based on gray market, lawfully
trademarked goods imported into the United Kingdom from
other European Community member states. A U.S. seller ex-
porting goods directly to the United Kingdom cannot rely on the
EC doctrines, however, and therefore must be aware of the more
restrictive rule applied under U.K. national law."'
2. Copyright
The U.K. copyright rule is clear: the copyright holder has a
cause of action against one who imports into the United King-
dom an article whose manufacture infringed the copyright or
would have infringed it if the law had applied where the article
was manufactured. Under the statute, it does not matter
whether the copyright owner has licensed the copyright in an-
109. I. at 1062.
110. Case 258/78 Nungesser v. Commission E.C.R. 2015, 2069-71 (1982). An
"open" exclusive license binds the licensor not to compete with the licensee or
to license others to do so, but, in contrast with a "closed" exclusive license, does
not seek to confer "absolute" territorial protection on the licensee by re-
straining gray market imports. Id. at 2068.
111. Because the EC rules would not be applied to a direct import from the
United States to the United Kingdom, it might appear that some protection
against gray market imports of this sort could be achieved. But this is not
likely; it would be easy to import the goods to another EC country first (where
the U.K. trademark holder would not be protected) and then re-export the
goods to the United Kingdom as inter-EC trade.
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other country; what matters is whether the copyright owner has
licensed the import.112 This appears to grant both pirate and full
gray market protection, although in contrast with the American
rule, the importer of such a product infringes only if he knows
or has reason to know of the copyright infringement. 113
As in the case of trademarks, however, the U.K. statute
must be interpreted consistently with the EC Treaty. The ECJ
has held that in the case of a tangible article such as a book, the
copyright owner exhausts his right when he sells or authorizes
another to sell the book in a member state of the European
Community. 114 Again, this is a first sale doctrine, and it is
stronger than that applied in the United States because the U.S.
rule does not apply unless the work is both made and sold in the
United States. 115 Consequently, the copyright owner is pro-
tected only against pirate copies; copies which are legally pro-
duced and sold under license in any other state of the European
Community 16 must be admitted to the United Kingdom. The
copyright owner presumably could apply the U.K. statute to an
article imported from a state outside of the European Commu-
nity, but this would be of little avail because the article could be
imported first to another EC state (where the U.K. statute
would not apply) and then imported into the United Kingdom
under the EC rule. The U.K. copyright holder thus has little
protection against gray market imports. A U.K. buyer under the
CISG would be liable to a claim of copyright infringement, and
thus a claim would arise under Article 42 only if the goods were
pirate copies, or if the import were imported directly to the
United Kingdom from a non-EC member state.
3. Patents
U.K. law is less protective of patent owners than of copy-
right owners; a patent holder exhausts his rights when he sells
or authorizes the sale of the patented item, which may thereaf-
ter be imported into the United Kingdom without infringing the
112. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988 § 22.
113. Id.; see also A. Hoolahan et al., Copyright, in 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND para. 920 (1974).
114. Case 78/70 Deutsch Grammophon Gesellsehaft v. Metro-SB-Gross-
markte, E.C.R. 487 (1971); see also Vaughn, supra note 67, para. 19-365. The
rule may be different when an intangible, such as the right to exhibit a motion
picture, is at issue. That would not involve the sale of a good, however, and is
thus outside the concern of the CISG.
115. See NnMMER, supra note 77, § 8.12[B][6].
116. These situations would be Cases 2 and 3 under K-Mart.
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patent.1 7 This is a strict version of the first sale doctrine. The
same general rule exists in the European Community; once a
product is sold to a third party by the patentee or his licensee in
any member state, it may be imported freely into any other
member state."" Because the concern in the European Commu-
nity is the effect of patents on competition, however, the rules
are complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Certain li-
censing agreements which would restrict competition between a
licensor and licensee are allowed under a "block exemption,""19
and the specific terms in patent licenses may make a crucial dif-
ference.120 A U.K. buyer of non-pirated patented goods, how-
ever, is protected by the U.K. rule without having to rely on the
EC doctrines.' 21 Little danger exists that such a buyer would be
subject to a third-party claim based on patent rights. Thus, the
seller would not be liable under Article 42.
The United Kingdom recently established a new "design
right" which has some aspects of both a patent and a copy-
right.122 It protects the specific design of an article, but is like a
copyright because it is unregistered and does not require an ex-
amination or a showing of novelty. The statute gives the design
right owner protection against imports that infringe the design
right in the case of an unauthorized or pirate copy, and also in
the case of an authorized copy that is imported in violation of a
licensing agreement.123 This appears to be an attempt to legis-
late gray market protection based on the design right, although
the statute explicitly subjects the new protection to overriding
EC law.124 Because there is no reason to believe the ECJ would
view the design right any differently from other aspects of intel-
lectual property regarding its effects on trade, licensing agree-
117. Betts v. Willmott, 6 Ch. App. 239 (1871); see T. White & Mary Vitoria,
Patents and Inventions, 35 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 584, at 326.
118. Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, E.C.R. 1147, 1162, 1168
(1974); see Vaughn, supra note 67, §§ 19-338 at 1068. Centrafarm involved a pat-
entee who licensed the patent rights in another country. The licensee sold to a
third party who then resold the goods in the patentee's country.
119. I& §§ 19-339 to 19-342.
120. Id §§ 19-343 to 19-354. Broadly speaking, the EC rule is similar to the
U.S. rule: there is no protection from gray market competition by third parties,
but bilateral licenses may restrict competition between the parties.
121. This appears to be true whether the buyer buys from a third party or
from a licensee selling outside of her license. In the latter case the licensor
might have a case against the seller directly, but not against the buyer. Article
42 would not apply.
122. Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988 §§ 227, 228.
123. Id.
124. Id § 228(5).
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ments restricting gray market imports are likely to be struck
down absent special circumstances.125 Thus, it seems unlikely
that the U.K. design right statute could give rise to a third-party
claim against a buyer of goods manufactured and sold in another
EC state under license, even if the license explicitly forbade
such imports.
In summary, while U.K. law appears to grant substantial
gray market protection in trademark and copyright cases, the
overriding EC rules prevent that protection from being effective
in any case in which a product is lawfully sold to a third party in
any member state. Once sold, the product can move freely to
any other state. As in U.S. law, certain bilateral license agree-
ments restricting competition between the parties can be en-
forced, but these cases would involve suits directly against the
licensee-seller, to which CISG Article 42 would be irrelevant.
III. CONCLUSION
From this summary of intellectual property protection in
the United States, United Kingdom and European Community,
it is clear that the extent to which a particular sale of goods may
raise the possibility of third-party claims based on IPRs is a mat-
ter of complicated national law, and increasingly of suprana-
tional law as well. The extent of the liability, if any, would
depend on the specific nature of the goods; the specific provision
under national law for the patent, copyright, trademark, or
other right asserted; the nature of any licensing or other agree-
ments involved; and the way all these factors interact with anti-
trust and unfair competition doctrines. Although the general
rules with respect to gray market constraints in the United
States, United Kingdom and European Community are not diffi-
cult to describe, many situations could raise IPR issues other
than gray market constraints.
This general situation supports the earlier argument that
Article 42 should not be interpreted to place a duty on the seller
to carefully research the possible IPR implications of a sale. It
should be sufficient to require the seller to be reasonably aware
125. In a case involving "plant breeder's rights" akin to patents, the ECJ
held a licensing agreement that restricted gray market imports inconsistent
with EC law in the face of arguments that exclusive licensing arrangements
should be justified by the fact the hybrid seeds involved had to be specially
tailored for specific regions. Case 258/78 Nungesser v. Commission E.C.R. 2015,
2060-71 (1982).
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of IPR claims based on information the seller possesses, and to
tell the buyer what the seller knows about the situation.
The seller, however, cannot safely assume that a court or
other tribunal would in fact interpret Article 42 in this way. To
protect the seller, the contract should include a term which
makes clear what liability, if any, the seller is willing to accept
under Article 42, and, citing Article 6,126 that any other such lia-
bility is disclaimed.
126. See supra note 19.
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